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Abstract
This paper analyzes dynamic selection eﬀects that arise in a regulated
market where price structures are determined by a regulator or central
management. Consumers come in diﬀerent types where each type re-
quires a diﬀerent service or treatment. We show that for a large class of
price structures some group of customers is refused the service. Equilibria
with selection are welfare inferior to equilibria without selection. We also
characterize the class of price structures for which selection does not arise.
As the number of customers increases or agents become more patient the
class of selection-free price structures shrinks and in the limit it is unique.
Moreover, all other price structures induce selection. The general model
can be applied to a variety of markets, including health care and taxi
markets.
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11 Introduction
Consider yourself arriving after a long trip at the railway station of your ﬁnal
destination. You know it is not too far to your hotel, but you want to take
a taxi because of your luggage and because of the fatigue. Taxis are standing
in line and have regulated non-negotiable fees. You walk up to the ﬁrst taxi
waiting in line and after hearing where you want to be taken, the driver tells
you that you better walk because he refuses to take on passengers for such a
short distance. As an economist, you may wonder: is this rational behaviour
on the part of the taxi driver? If so, what is the role of the fare structure and
does a fare structure exists where potential passengers are not refused? Can it
be socially optimal that potential passengers are refused?
There are a certain number of elements that are crucial to the above exam-
ple. First, consumers arrive sequentially to demand some service and come in
diﬀerent treatment times or “complexities”. In the taxi example: diﬀerent pas-
sengers have diﬀerent travel destinations and thus require diﬀerent travel time.
Second, the fare structure (how price depends on treatment time or “complex-
ity”) is ﬁxed by a regulating authority or central company management. In
the taxi example: in diﬀerent countries around the world, taxi drivers are not
free to determine their own fare structure, but the fare structure is centrally
programmed in the taxi meter. Third, agents who actually provide the service
can either accept or reject customers based on comparison of beneﬁts and costs.
In the taxi example: taxi drivers are “free” to tell potential clients that they
do not take them.1 It is optimal for a taxi driver to refuse a passenger if the
expected discounted revenue of waiting for the next passenger (the chance of
getting “ big ﬁsh”) is larger than the revenue of taking the current passenger
and waiting before a next passenger can be taken on. This, of course, assumes
that the taxi driver receives at least a part of the revenue of the ride.
The taxi market is not the only market where these features are present. In
many countries, many parts of the medical sector also satisfy the main features
outlined above. First, patients demanding some treatment enter a hospital or
private clinic sequentially. Second, medical doctors are not free to set their
own fees, but instead the fees per treatment are set by government authorities.
Finally, medical doctors can refuse to take on patients and send them to other
hospitals sometimes giving the argument that other doctors are better equipped
to provide the proper treatment. Instead of selection, one may also observe
what is called demand inducement in health care markets where medical doctors
provide either more or a diﬀerent treatment than what would be socially optimal
for a patient with a particular disease. The phenomenon of demand inducement
is of the same nature as the selection that appears in taxi markets: it exists
because the provider prefers to deal with a diﬀerent type of customer than the
one they actually face. Though taxi drivers cannot induce demand (there is
no possibility of bringing the customer to some other location), for medical
doctors it is possible to provider some unnecessary treatment. Since demand
1A more oﬃcial way to say this is that it is very diﬃcult to enforce a system where taxi
drivers have to take all passengers.
2inducement by its nature is similar to selection, it can also be studied as part
of our general framework. Other markets that have features that are described
above include the market for social attorneys2 and some repair markets (shoes,
electronics) where prices for standard repairs are set at the central management
level and franchise holders bear the revenues and costs.
In this paper we analyze markets that are characterized by the three features
mentioned above. We show that for a large class of price schedules, selection
(or demand inducement) is a crucial aspect of the equilibrium in these markets:
depending on the price schedule either consumers with a low level of complexity
or consumers with a high level of complexity are refused. We then characterize
the (class of) price structures for which selection does not arise. As the number
of customers increases or agents become more patient this class of selection-
free price structures shrinks and in the limit it is unique. We also show that
selection is always bad from a welfare point of view in the sense that for any
price structure that gives rise to selection, there exists another price structure
without selection that generates a higher total surplus.
To the best of our knowledge there are relatively few papers on selection ef-
fects in regulated markets. There is, however, some literature on demand induce-
ment in health care markets, where the modeling and measurement of induced
demand is one of the main topics. This literature started with Evans (1974)
who studied ”supply-induced demand”. McGuire and Pauly (1991) studied the
demand inducement problem under regulated fees in a static setup and they
characterized possible demand inducement based on physician’s utility function
(where intrinsic motivation also plays a role). They studied physicians responses
to changes in fees as well. The model is static, although time is taken into ac-
count through the physician’s preference for leisure. Gruber and Owings (1996)
extended the model by introducing a parameter capturing overall demand and
supply conditions. Wright (2007) described selection of the patients between
public and private hospitals based on diﬀerent fee structures. To the best of
our knowledge no paper in this literature studies the optimal price structure
avoiding demand inducement and they also do not provide a dynamic analysis
of selection or demand inducement.
On taxi markets, there is some literature on the desirability of entry and price
regulation. Tullock (1975) and Williams (1980), among others, have argued in
favour of deregulation, basically using standard arguments on the welfare eﬀects
of perfect competition. Proponents of regulation (such as Beesley (1973, 1979)
and Teal and Berglund (1987) have argued that due to the pecularities of the
taxi market, some form of regulation may be necessary for a proper functioning
of the market. Cairnes and Heyes (1996) also mention the rather mixed success
with experimentation with deregulation in some US cities in the 1980s leading
those cities to back away from the deregulation policy. Whatever one’s views on
the (theoretical) desirability of regulating the taxi market, fact is that most taxi
2In quite a few countries, low income families can apply for legal aid (attorneys) at a
regulated fee. The fee structure has been modiﬁed recently in The Netherlands and this has
lead to selection eﬀects as attorneys argued the fee structure is such that they cannot provide
legal aid to certain clients.
3markets around the globe are heavily regulated. Cities as diverse in nature as
New York, London, Tokyo, Amsterdam, Shanghai and Singapore all have price
structures which are regulated (see, e.g., Yang et al. 2005). Although every city
has a structure with an initial charge and a distance-based charge, the precise
nature of the price structure diﬀers from city to city.3 What is striking is that
certainly for smaller distances, almost all price structures are linear in distance.
In some cities the price proportional to distance becomes lower, if distance is
beyond a certain threshold. In this paper we show that such price structures
always lead to selection of some customers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes in
detail the general model of selection we are analyzing in some detail. Section
3 presents the main results for generic price structures. Section 4 extends the
analysis to study demand inducement eﬀects where suppliers have the possibility
of giving consumers a treatment that is diﬀerent from the socially most optimal
treatment given their complexity. Section 5 brieﬂy analyzes the case where the
arrival rate of customers follows a Poisson process. Section 6 concludes.
2 General Model
Consider a market where a consumer arrives and demands some service in each
certain time interval ∆t. Assume each consumer is characterized by a level of
complexity θ which is randomly distributed over the interval [θmin,θmax], with
distribution F(θ). A customer of complexity θ derives a utility u(θ) from a
service and a customer’s reservation utility is normalized to 0. The market
is (centrally) regulated, which means that the price structure per unit g(θ) is
ﬁxed by a central authority or by central management. Note, that the central
authority does not observe the complexity θ of a particular customer; it just sets
up a complete price structure for any θ. There are N (suﬃciently large to meet
the demand) agents who provide the service and in the basic model they simply
decide whether or not to accept a customer on the basis of expected costs and
beneﬁts. This decision takes place after the customer reveals the information
about his complexity θ. Sometimes it is more beneﬁcial for the agent not to
take the ﬁrst customer, but to wait for the next one. For simplicity, agents have
inﬁnite planning horizons and maximize the expected present value of future
cash ﬂows. Payment is made just at the moment when the customer is accepted.
It is not possible for agents to inﬂuence the price structure. There are material
costs per c(θ) and the time to treat a consumer of complexity θ is given by t(θ).
The time cost implies that when a consumer is accepted no other consumer can
be treated during the time period t(θ). We deﬁne f(θ) = g(θ) − c(θ) to be the
net price. We assume that for any θ ∈ [θmin,θmax] f(θ) > 0 to exclude trivial
selection cases.
Obviously for some price structures it can be the case that it is more prof-
itable to refuse a customer now, and to wait for the next one. In general it
3In addition, the fare may depend on delay-based charges, and additional week-end or
night charges.
4is possible that multiple groups of customers are excluded due to selection,
but there is a subcase that is of particular interest, namely where selection
is monotone. We say that selection is monotone if it is not the case that a
customer with complexity θ1 is accepted and both customers with θ0 < θ1
and θ2 > θ1 are not accepted. Though the analysis below is applicable to the
more general case where selection is not monotone, monotone selection allows
us to simplify notation as it can be characterized by a unique cut-oﬀ level θa
for which either all customers with smaller or larger complexities are not ac-
cepted (so we can parameterize selection). In case of low-θ selection, we get
that the support of Φ(θ;θa) is [θa;θmax], where θa is the lowest accepted com-
plexity and Φ(θ;θa) =
F(θ)−F(θa)
1−F(θa) . For high-θ selection, we obtain that the




If there is selection, the probability that an agent faces an acceptable cus-
tomer each period is p(θa) which is equal 1 − F(θa) for the low-selection case
and F(θa) for the high-selection case.
We assume that the objective function of agents is their discounted expected
value of future cash ﬂows conditional on θ: v(θ).4 The unconditional expected
value of future cash ﬂows we denote by V . It is important to emphasize that
the value of V , which is the value prior to the moment when an agent knows the
complexity of a particular customer, should be distinguished from the value of
the process after this complexity is revealed. This latter value is v(θ) and can
be either larger or smaller than V . The discount factor δ is assumed to be the
same for all agents. As the model horizon is inﬁnite and each time the agent
has to make a decision whether or not to take a customer he faces the same
situation, V has to be constant over time.
In case of monotone selection, the agent’s decision-making problem can be
presented as in the tree below.
Once the agent knows the particular θ of a customer, he can either accept or
reject the customer. If he accepts, he receives the price f(θ) from the customer
and some expected continuation value. If he rejects the customer, he faces an
acceptable customer with probability p(θa) in the next period, or he has to
wait until the next period after that which gives him discounted value V . In an
equilibrium with selection, the agent compares the value of accepting a customer
now f(θ) + δt(θ,θa)V with the expected value of waiting, which equals
p(θa)
h
δ∆tEΦ(f(θ) + δt(θ,θa)V )
i
+ (1 − p(θa))δ2∆tV.
If the pricing structure is such that every consumer is provided the service, then
the agent should at least weakly better oﬀ by taking the consumers. As we will
see, this invokes some restrictions on the parameters of the model.
4We abstract from discussions whether providers are also lead by diﬀerent considerations,
such as the health of their patients or the socially optimal level of service. We only say that
if the provider is indiﬀerent between providing any type of service, he will choose to provide
the optimal service.





















We are now ready to proceed with the analysis of the model. We ﬁrst consider
situations where every consumer is provided the service and then consider the
case when selection may occur.
3.1 Full participation case
We now ﬁrst characterize the (class of) price structure(s) that is such that all
customers participate in equilibrium. Note, that in case of full participation
p(θa) = 1 so that the continuation value V is deﬁned by:
V = E(f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ), (3.1)
where t(θ,∅) is just a t(θ,θa) in case there is no selection.
Full participation means that agents have no incentives to reject customers.
Therefore, for any θ from the support of F(θ) we must have:
f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ≥ δ∆tV (3.2)
where V is deﬁned above.
Thus, we can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. A price structure f(θ) insures full participation of customers
if and only if equations (3.1),(3.2) hold for f(θ).
In general for a given price structure f(θ), agents may still prefer one type
of customer to another even if all customers are taken. But since ∆t is some
ﬁnite number, the agents still have no incentives to reject any consumer as the
customer with the least proﬁtable θ now is better than a costumer with an
average θ later.
6A particular case of an optimal price structure is when agents are purely
indiﬀerent between the customers, which means that even if ∆t goes to 0, se-
lection does not arise in a market equilibrium. We deﬁne this particular price
structure in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. The tariﬀ structure that makes agents indiﬀerent between
customers and thereby eliminating selection is deﬁned by:
f∗(θ) = V (1 − δt(θ,∅)) (3.3)
where V is continuation value.
Proof. Since agents are indiﬀerent among the customers, the value must be
constant in θ and equal to the expected value V . Thus, the equation
V = f∗(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V (3.4)
must hold for any θ as an identity. Therefore,
f∗(θ) = V (1 − δt(θ,∅)). (3.5)
Now we need to check conditions (3.1) and (3.2). For (3.1) we obtain:
V = E

V (1 − δt(θ,∅)) + δt(θ,∅)V

= V (3.6)
For (3.2) we obtain:
V (1 − δt(θ,∅)) + δt(θ,∅)V = V > δ∆tV (3.7)
which completes the proof.
Note that the value of V is not determined here – it is a free parameter
determining the level of prices in the model and we can assign any arbitrary
value to it.
We summarize our results so far by means of the following graph (see ﬁgure
2).
The expectation of v(θ) for all prices must be equal to V . For the price
structure f∗(θ) we have that v(θ) is a constant, i.e., v(θ) = V . Price structure A
does not imply a constant value: agents prefer customers with lower complexity.
But given the waiting time ∆t it is still optimal to accept all the customers. If the
arrival frequency of customers increases this price can induce high-complexity
selection. Price structure B induces low-complexity selection: customers with θ
lower than θB
a are not accepted. price structure C leads to selection from the
top, all customers with complexity higher than θC
a are not accepted.














3.2 Dynamic Selection at busy places: general case
A natural question to ask is what will happen at busy places, where the time
that elapses between consecutive customers arriving is very small. Analytically,
we analyze situations where ∆t is arbitrarily small. We will show that in this
case, all selection-free price structures are suﬃciently close to f∗(θ), i.e., price
structures that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the price structure where agents
are indiﬀerent between any of the customers lead to selection.
To this end, we ﬁrst introduce the class of selection-free price structures.
Since the value V determines the level of prices, we consider structures with
the same V . Let FV (δ,∆t) be the class of all price structures such that the
following three requirements are met:
• for any f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t) there is full participation in the market, i.e.
condition (3.2) is satisﬁed for all θ in the support of the distribution;
• any f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t) gives to the agent the expected value V ;
• for any f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t) and all θ u(θ) > f(θ).
We assume that for all customers the utility derived from a service is large
enough so that at least f∗(θ) is in FV (δ,∆t), and hence, so that FV (δ,∆t) is
not empty. With this deﬁnition, we can state the following proposition.5
5A similar proposition can be proven for the case where the discount factor δ goes to 1.
To economize on space, this proposition is not included in the text.
8Proposition 3.3. For any  > 0 there is a ∆t∗ such that for any ∆t<∆t∗ all
selection-free price structures deﬁned on [θmin,θmax] are -close to the optimal
one, i.e. satisfy the following two conditions:
1. f∗(θ) − f(θ) < ;
2.
R θmax
θmin |f∗(θ) − f(θ)|dF(θ) < 2(θmax − θmin).
Proof. 1. Recall, that by deﬁnition
f∗(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V = V
for all θ in the support of F(θ). Also note, that since f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t) we
have that for all θ
f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ≥ δ∆tV.
By taking diﬀerence we obtain
f∗(θ) − f(θ) ≤ (1 − δ∆t)V
then by choosing ∆t∗ =
ln(1− 
V )
lnδ for any ∆t < ∆t∗ we get that
f∗(θ) − f(θ) < 
which proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
2. To prove the second part recall, that since both price structures belong to
FV (δ,∆t) we have
Ef∗(θ) + V Eδt(θ,∅) = V




[f∗(θ) − f(θ)]dF(θ) = 0 (3.8)
Let A+ be a set of all θ in the support of distribution, such that f∗(θ) ≥
























|f∗(θ) − f(θ)|dF(θ) = 2
Z
A+
[f∗(θ) − f(θ)]dF(θ) < 2(θmax − θmin)
Intuitively, when ∆t becomes arbitrarily small, the cost of waiting for the
next customer vanishes as well and waiting gives you the expected continuation
pay-oﬀ. In this case, the only price structure that does not give rise to selection is
the one where every complexity yields (approximately) the same revenue (which
is equal to the expected value). This is exactly how the price structure f∗(θ) is
characterized.
It is interesting to next investigate the welfare issues arising from selection.
Our analysis shows that from the point of view of social welfare price structures
with full participation are better than structures inducing selection.
We deﬁne social welfare as the sum of consumer and producer (agents) sur-
plus. Producer surplus is simply equal to the discounted value of future pay-oﬀs
for the agents multiplied by the number of agents in the market. Each consumer
has a utility of u(θ) − f(θ) per service taken, which is his or her surplus. In-
tegrating over all consumers (or over all services taken by consumers) that are
accepted in equilibrium we arrive at the expected consumer surplus. So social
welfare conditional on V is given by:
SW(V ) = N · V + M
Z
SΦ
(u(θ) − f(θ))dF(θ) (3.9)
where SΦ is the support of the distribution under selection and M is some
weighting parameter. Integration over SΦ implies that we calculate surplus only
for the customers who are accepted in equilibrium, since the others receive their
reservation utility, which is zero.
Proposition 3.4. Consider a tariﬀ structure g(θ) which induces selection, and
delivers value V to the agents. Then any f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t) yields social welfare
that is larger than under g(θ).
Proof. Consider some f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t). Since both fare structures g(θ) and
f(θ) deliver value V to the agents, producer surplus equals NV in both cases.
On the other hand, under fare structure g(θ) less customers participate in the











(u(θ) − f(θ))dF(θ) >
Z
SΦ




(u(θ) − g(θ))dF(θ) = W(g(θ))
. (3.11)
Since agents’ surplus is constant, it follows that social welfare is larger in
the full participation case for any positive value of M.
Whether or not the socially optimal price is necessarily also a Pareto-improvement
depends on the consumers processing time function. Indeed, for the optimal
price structure f∗(θ) we have:
f∗(θ) = (1 − δt(θ,∅))V. (3.12)
For a price structure with selection at θa we have:
g(θa) = (δ∆t − δt(θ,θa))V. (3.13)
Note, that if t(θ,∅) is quite close to t(θ,θa) (e.g. when consumer processing
time is exogenous) customers with θ close to θa are better oﬀ under g(θ). Thus,
if each customer has a ﬁxed level of service complexity θ, then the optimal price
structure may not be Pareto-optimal. However, if consumers’ complexities vary
in time so that each customer is interested in expected surplus rather than
surplus generated for a particular value of θ, then the price that maximizes
social welfare is also Pareto-improving.
4 Demand Inducement
The framework developed so far also allows us to analyze the demand induce-
ment (or moral hazard) problem which can arise in health care markets. A
medical doctor is, in principle, able to provide a customer of complexity θ with
some other service θ0 as no one apart from him knows the exact value of θ. This
problem of ”demand inducement” can be analyzed in our framework as follows.
Assume the agent, say a medical doctor, can provide the customer with
the level of service which is not required by his complexity. For example, he
can prescribe some extra (unnecessary) treatment. If the customer (and the
regulator who determines the price structure) does not know the true level of
complexity, payment for this (unnecessary) treatment is made. We assume that
pure fraud (reporting that a certain treatment is given while this is actually not
the case) is not possible: if the true value is θ and the agent decides to provide












service with level of complexity θ0, then the required treatment time is t(θ0,θa)
and the payment to the service provider is given by the net price f(θ0). Thus,
the agent can substitute the true θ with θ0 but then it is necessary to perform
the treatment that is required by θ0 and he is payed for that.
It is clear that if there is a possibility for moral hazard the option “do not
accept” is no longer relevant to the agent: a medical doctor can always treat
the customer as the best customer from his perspective. We denote the level of
complexity of this best customer as θ0 ∈ Argmaxθ(f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ). Then, the
decision tree of the agent looks like:
Thus, the agent can either accept the customer and treat him truthfully
or cheat (we skip non-optimal ways of cheating since they are dominated by
θ0). Note, that the processing time is t(θ,∅) or t(θ0,∅) which indicates that
in the equilibrium of the model with the possibility of demand inducement
the equilibrium level of selection is zero as the agents can always take on the
costumer and provide a treatment that yields the highest possible pay-oﬀ.
The next Proposition argues that under the optimal price structure, the
agent does not have an incentive to induce extra demand.
Proposition 4.1. Under the optimal price structure 3.3 there is no pair (θ,θ0)
from the support of F(θ) such that θ0 is better for the agents than θ.
Proof. Recall, that the optimal fare structure is deﬁned by
f∗(θ) = V (1 − δt(θ,∅))
Then the expected value of the service process for any θ after it has been
observed is deﬁned by:
f∗(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V = (1 − δt(θ,∅))V + δt(θ,∅)V = V = f∗(θ0) + δt(θ0,∅)V (4.1)
12Thus, the optimal price structure f∗(θ) we characterize allows to avoid both
selection and moral hazard (demand inducement) problems in regulated mar-
kets. Given the optimal price structure, service providers are indiﬀerent between
providing (and getting paid for) any possible treatment and so they do not have
an incentive to cheat. If they have a slight preference for given the optimal
socially eﬃcient treatment they will do so.
5 Stochastic arrival process
So far, we have studied the case where in any given time interval, only one
potential costumer arrives. In this section we show that our results are robust to
the case where customers arrive according to a Poisson process instead of having
one customer arriving at a particular moment in time. To this end, assume ∆t is
now distributed according to an exponential distribution with parameter λ. Self-
selection of customers leads to a decrease in the intensity of the Poisson process:
if p(θa) is the fraction of customers that is taken in a selection equilibrium, then
the intensity parameter of the arrival process equals λ(θa) = λp(τa). This means
that the average waiting time until the next customer comes is 1
λp(θa).
Taxi drivers form expectations concerning the arrival time of the next cus-
tomer. To derive the optimal decision-making rule for drivers we need the
following result.
















Now we can apply this result to all previous sections. To do so we just need
to replace a predetermined discount factor δa∆t by the expected discount factor
λ
λ−alnδ. Then we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2. The price structure f∗(θ) ensures full participation of cus-
tomers if and only if:
V = E(f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ) (5.3)
and




13The optimal price structure is not aﬀected by changing the arrival process,
therefore Proposition 3.2 still holds, and the price structure which ensures full
participation for any value of the intensity λ is given by:
f∗(θ) = V (1 − δt(θ,∅)).
For an arbitrary net price structure f(θ), which leads to selection, the lowest
(highest) accepted type is deﬁned by the following equation:
f(θa) + δt(θ,θa)V = p(θa)
λ
λ − lnδ






which corresponds to (3.2) (put as equality) in the non-stochastic case.
Finally, since the proof of proposition 3.4 is invariant with respect to the
nature of ∆t the price structure (3.3) is still socially optimal under stochastic
customer arrival conditions.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed dynamic selection eﬀects that arise in some
regulated markets. Our framework applies when three core conditions are sat-
isﬁed: (i) consumers arrive sequentially at some moments of time (a stochastic
arrival process is also possible) and diﬀer in their types (complexity of service
required); (ii) price structures, with price depending on the level of complexity
of a costumer, are ﬁxed by a regulator or another authority or by central man-
agement and (iii) agents (providers of the service) can either accept or reject
the customers based on a comparison of beneﬁts and costs (or, in an extension,
can decide to give a diﬀerent treatment).
We have shown that for a large class of fare structures customers with a
low level of complexity or customers with a high level of complexity are refused
the service. Equilibria with selection are welfare inferior to equilibria without
selection. We have characterized the class of price structures for which selection
does not arise. For markets with very many customers, this price structure is
unique up to a scaling factor. The optimal price structure also prevents moral
hazard to arise if service providers can induce demand (as in the medical sector).
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